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I.

INTRODUCTION

This Article examines if, and how, the laws of war apply to conflicts
involving non-state actors-whether they are guerrilla groups, terrorist
organizations or private military contractors.'
The lack of reciprocity prevailing in conflicts involving non-state
* Radzyner School of Law, Interdisciplinary Center (IDC), Herzliya; Ph.D., Tel Aviv
University; LL.M, Yale Law School; Diploma in Legal Studies, University of Oxford; Maitrise
de Droit, Universit6 Panthdon-Assas (Paris II). This Article is the fruit of two separate, yet
related, research projects. First, this Article draws on research conducted as part of my doctoral
dissertation at Tel Aviv University, under the supervision of Professor Eyal Benvenisti. In
addition, it greatly benefited from my participation in the New Battlefield, Old Laws project
undertaken jointly by the Institute for National Security and Counterterrorism at the Syracuse
College of Law and the Institute for Counter-terrorism at the IDC Herzliya. Any mistakes are, of
course, mine only. An earlier and different version of this Article appeared in New
Battlefields/OldLaws, edited by William C. Banks and published by Columbia University Press.
1. Please note that the expression "laws of war" and "international humanitarian law" are
used interchangeably in this Article.
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actors raises the question of the applicability of the laws of war to these
conflicts. "Reciprocity" in international law refers to the expectation by
a belligerent state that other state parties to a conflict will respect
similar legal and behavioral norms, such as non-use of prohibited
weaponry, minimization of collateral damage, and humane treatment of
prisoners of war. Non-state actors, which are not party to treaty-based
norms regulating the conduct of war, cannot be assumed to operate on
the basis of reciprocity. Given that reciprocity is the assumption
underlying this entire body of law, the question arises of whether, in the
absence of reciprocity, the law continues to apply. I answer this
question in the affirmative. I argue that the involvement of non-state
actors in warfare does not, in and of itself, affect the applicability of the
laws of war. The only situation in which a state may not be bound by all
of humanitarian law is when an opposing non-state party repeatedly
violates international humanitarian law in an international armed
conflict.
Having established the applicability of most, if not all, of
international humanitarian law to most conflicts involving non-state
actors, I analyze the application of the law to these actors. The
application of the law is complicated by the fact that, when dealing with
non-state actors, civilians and combatants may not be clearly
distinguishable. In order to overcome this challenge, I argue for a more
expansive interpretation of the concept of "combatant"-one which
allows for the greater application of international humanitarian law to
these actors, an easier implementation of the principle of distinction,
and improved protection of civilian populations.
This interpretation draws on an expanded body of sources (religious,
moral, historical and legal) designed to inform our understanding of the
principle of distinction. I review the historical evolution of the principle,
how it became fundamental to international humanitarian law, and how
the concept of "combatant" evolved over time from an activity-based to
a membership-based designation. I then examine the substance of the
law as stated in the Geneva Conventions, 2 which diverge, I argue, from
both earlier and subsequent characterizations of combatant status. I
conclude by offering an interpretation of combatant status which would
2. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter First
Geneva Convention] (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Second Geneva Convention] (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Third Geneva Convention] (entered into
Protection of Civilian Persons in
force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva
Convention] (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950).
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allow more non-state actors to accede to combatant status.

II. RECIPROCITY-OR THE APPLICABILITY OF THE LAWS

OF WAR TO

NON-STATE ACTORS

Borrowing

from

general

international

law,

international

humanitarian law builds on the notion that a state is generally willing to
grant another state's citizens certain protections it wishes to be
guaranteed to its own. In times of war, the laws of war seek to provide
an incentive for states to limit inhumane treatment of enemies.
Reciprocity, however, is much less of a concern to non-state actors. For
a variety of reasons, the idea of reciprocal rights and duties simply does
not translate well to entities that generally do not feel bound by
international law. Absent reciprocity, do the laws of war apply to these
non-state actors?
This section analyzes the implications of the breakdown of the
reciprocal relationship between states and non-states. In Iraq, where
both states and non-state actors are engaged in hostilities, there is no
real expectation of reciprocity by any party. Does the absence of
reciprocity, on which the laws of war are based, imply that the laws of
war cease to be applicable to the conflict? At the heart of the issue is the
question of whether the laws of war should be regarded as a set of
interdependent obligations or as unilateral and unconditional
undertakings.
Discussions of the importance of reciprocity on the laws of war
abound, often in the context of terrorist organizations or guerrilla
groups. But the question is also relevant to other non-state entities found
on the modem battlefield, such as private military contractors. Taking
into account the prominence of non-state actors today, reciprocity
constitutes a threshold issue in the applicability of the laws of war to an
increasing number of conflicts.
I argue that in the vast majority of cases reciprocity has minimal
relevance. Despite the conflicting messages provided by the laws of war
on the role of reciprocity, such laws envisage only one situation in
which a state is no longer required to comply with humanitarian law:
3.

E.g., RENt PROVOST, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITARIAN LAW 121

(1st ed. 2002) ("International law, being a system based on the formal equality and sovereignty
of states, has arisen largely out of the exchange of reciprocal rights and duties between states.").
See also FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPT., FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF GENEVA
OF 1949 VOL II-A 813-14 (Berne ed., 1963).
4. Examples of conflicts involving non-state actors include the U.S. global fight against
al-Qaeda, Israel's conflicts with Hezbollah (2006) and Hamas (2009), the conflict between the
Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (2009), and the growing
violence pitting Pakistani forces against the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan.
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when, in an international armed conflict, the state fights against a nonstate actor that neither accepts nor applies the law. Even in such a
situation, certain principles continue to apply. Thus, I conclude, only
part of humanitarian law would cease to apply in the limited
circumstances where a state is fighting a non-compliant non-state entity
as part of an international armed conflict. In all other situations and
conflicts, the absence of reciprocity would have no effect on the
applicability of the laws of war. This conclusion, which acknowledges
the limited role of reciprocity, echoes the humanitarian concerns
embedded into the laws of war.
A. Reciprocity in InternationalHumanitarianLaw: An Ambivalent and
Evolving Position
Determining whether the absence of reciprocity is fatal to the
application of international humanitarian law comes down to
establishing what the true objective of the law is: is it meant to advance
the interests of states in certain, limited, circumstances, or is it meant to
protect civilians in all armed conflicts? Each of these positions
embodies an essential purpose of the laws of war. The Geneva
Conventions were drafted by states for states, creating a set of
expectations and reassurances on which states can rely in time of war.
The underlying assumption is that a State Party will comply with the
laws of war in the hope that the other party will, too.5 Under this logic,
the entire purpose of the laws of war is that they are agreed to and
observed by both sides.6 Translated into legal terms, this would mean
that the obligations set forth by international humanitarian law are
interdependent; namely, when a party violates its side of the bargain the
other party ceases to be bound: "[rieciprocity refers to the
interdependence of obligations assumed by participants within the
schemes created by a legal system." 7 Or, as Richard Wasserstrom puts
it, "one side must do, or thinks it must do, whatever the other side
does."8
But what happens when, to paraphrase Wasserstrom, one side does
not do what the other side does? In such cases, those who regard
international humanitarian law exclusively as a state-to-state legal
vehicle, and consider that the obligations it sets forth are
interdependent, will view the absence of reciprocity as fatal to the

5. PROVOST, supra note 3, at 172-73.
6. George Mavrodes, Conventions and the Morality of War, in INTERNATIONAL ETHICS:
A PHILOSOPHY AND PUBLIC AFFAIRS READER 85 (Charles R. Beitz et al. eds., 1985).
7. See PROVOST, supra note 3, at 121.
8.

RICHARD A. WASSERSTROM, WAR AND MORALITY 56 (1970).
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applicability of the laws of war.9
An opposing line of thinking shifts the focus of the law from the
state to the individual, and holds that the purpose of humanitarian law is
primarily humanitarian.' 0 Protecting civilians in times of war was
without question among the most significant factors driving the
elaboration of the Geneva Conventions. The focus on the individual, as
opposed to the state, is often regarded as the raison d'tre of the Geneva
Conventions." In this context, suspending the application of the laws of
war in cases of non-reciprocity would negate its humanitarian character
and would be damaging to the protection of civilians.' 2 Even when one
party does not respect its side of the bargain, the other party still must
remain bound by its own.
I argue that this latter view is ascendant, even though the Geneva
Conventions and the Additional Protocols may have been understood
differently (and as more reciprocal in nature) by their drafters. During
the drafting sessions of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the question
arose whether the conventions would apply to conflicts between a
signatory state and an entity (state or otherwise) which had not ratified
the Geneva Conventions. 3 The U.S. delegation had suggested to "draft
the reciprocity clause by saying that the Convention[s] would apply if
the insurgent civil authority declared it would observe it."1 4 The Special
Committee entrusted with the task of resolving this question concluded
that a contracting state is not bound to apply the Convention in its
relations with an entity that neither recognizes itself as being bound by
9.

See, e.g., Dan Beiz, Is InternationalHumanitarianLaw Lapsing Into Irrelevance in

the War on International Terror?, 7 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 97, 115 (2006) (noting that

"[r]eciprocity is a vital element" in the utilitarian approach to the laws of war); James D.
Morrow, The Laws of War, Common Conjectures, and Legal Systems in InternationalPolitics,
31 J. LEGAL STUD. 41, 43 (2002) ("[1aws of war can be effective only to the extent that the
parties can enforce them against one another; they must possess both the ability and the
willingness to make the treaty work."); GEORG SCHWARZENBERGER, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW AS
APPLIED BY INTERNATIONAL COURTS AND TRIBUNALS: THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 452-53

(1968).
10. In support of the view that the purpose of the Conventions is mainly humanitarian,
see, e.g., PROVOST, supra note 3, at 137; Derek Jinks, The Applicability of the Geneva
Conventions to the "Global War on Terrorism," 46 VA. J. INT'L L. 165, 185 (2005); Chris af
Jochnick & Roger Normand, The Legitimation of Violence: A CriticalHistory of the Laws of
War, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 49, 55-57 (1994).
11. Nineteenth Meeting of the Diplomatic Conference, Diplomatic Conference of
Geneva, Vol. II, § A, May 19, 1949, at 675 ("point[ing] out that the Hague Convention was
intended to regulate relations between States, whereas the present Convention [civilians] was
concerned with the rights of individuals.").
12.

See PROVOST, supra note 3, at 171.

13.

FEDERAL POLITICAL DEPT.,

FINAL RECORD OF THE DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE OF

GENEVA OF 1949 VOL II-A 813-14 (Berne ed., 1963).

14.

Id. at 46.
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the Convention nor abides by it in practice.' 5
The present formulation of Article 2, common to all four Geneva
Conventions (Common Article 2), reflects these considerations:
Although one of the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the
present Convention, the Powers who are parties thereto shall
remain bound by it in their mutual relations. They shall
furthermore be bound by the Convention in relation to the said
Power, if the latter accepts and appliesthe provisions thereof.16
Common Article 2 embodies one of the few instances in which the
laws of war contemplate situations where reciprocity is lacking-in this
case, between a belligerent state that has ratified the Geneva
Conventions and another entity, also involved in the conflict, but not a
party to them. Common Article 2 enjoins state parties to continue to
apply the Geneva Conventions "in their mutual relations" among
themselves.' 8 As for their relationship vis-ai-vis a non-signatory
(referred to as a "Power" to distinguish non-signatory states from
"Contracting Parties"), a signatory is bound to comply only if the nonsignatory "accepts and applies the provisions" of the Geneva
Conventions.1 9 Common Article 2 thus provides valuable insight by (1)
providing for "bilateral reciprocity even within a multilateral, interstate
war"; and (2) subjecting the Geneva Conventions' application to a
minimum amount of reciprocity on the part of a non-signatory party.2 0
While the letter of Article 2 requires a certain degree of reciprocity
as a prerequisite to the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, since
1949 views have shifted toward a non-reciprocal conception of
compliance. In the well-respected Commentary of Jean Pictet to the
Geneva Conventions, for example, the case is made that the conventions
are coming to be regarded less and less as contracts concluded on
a basis of reciprocity in the national interests of the parties, and
more and more as a solemn affirmation of principles respected
for their own sake, a series of unconditional engagements on the

15. Id. ("The Chairman noted that the introduction of a clause according to which a Party
to the conflict shall be bound by the Convention only if the other Party respectively
acknowledges the same obligation, raised no objections.").
16. Third Geneva Convention, supranote 2, art. 3 (emphasis added).
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. MARK OSIEL, THE END OF RECIPROCITY: TERROR, TORTURE, AND THE LAW OF WAR 68
(2009).
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21

That a state must at all times comply with the laws of war-even
when an opposing party does not-has indeed become the prevailing
view. In recent forays of the U.N. Human Rights Council into the field
of international humanitarian law, the Human Rights Council has placed
absolute obligations on states to comply with international law even in
the clear absence of reciprocity. When addressing the ongoing conflict
in Sri Lanka, the Human Rights Council emphasized the obligation for
all parties-including the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam-to respect
norms of international humanitarian law regardless of reciprocity. 22 The
Human Rights Council condemned the use of human shields by the nonstate group, but did not consider how this might affect the obligations of
the government forces in Sri Lanka.23 Further illustrating the declining
role of reciprocity is the report of the mission led by Judge Richard
24
Goldstone on Operation Cast Lead. The report does not consider that
the conduct of a belligerent (in that case, Israel) should be analyzed
differently in liqht of the other party's (Hamas) disregard for
humanitarian law. s The lack of reciprocity has no apparent bearing on
the scope of Israel's obligations under the law. Setting aside
jurisdictional questions regarding the Human Rights Council's authority
to opine on matters squarely within the realm of humanitarian law, the
Human Rights Council's findings only strengthen the growing belief
that humanitarian obligations are not interdependent.
Also minimizing the legal relevance of reciprocity in war are the
"grave breaches" provisions common to all four Geneva Conventions:
"No High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any
other High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by
another High Contracting Party in respect of breaches referred to in the
preceding Article."2 6 These breaches are defined by the Geneva
21.

JEAN PICTET, COMMENTARY: GENEVA CONVENTION III RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT

OF PRISONERS OF WAR 20 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1960)

[hereinafter PICTET

COMMENTARY].

22. See U.N. Human Rights Council, 11th Special Session, The Human Rights Situation
in Sri Lanka (May 27, 2009), available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/
specialsession/1 1/index.htm.
23. Id.
24. See U.N. Human Rights Council, June 29-July 3, 2009, U.N. Doc A/HRC/12/48,
Report of the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict (Sept. 15, 2009),
available at http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrcouncil/specialsession/9/docs/UNFFMG
CReport.PDF.
25. See id.
26. The Grave Breaches Provisions are contained in Article 51 of Geneva Convention 1,
Article 52 of the Geneva Convention II, Article 130 of Geneva Convention III, and Article 147
of Geneva Convention IV. Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross, How "Grave Breaches" are Defined
in the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (Apr. 6, 2004), http://www.icrc.
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Conventions as: "wilful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including
biological experiments, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury
to body or health, and extensive destruction and appropriation of
property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully
and wantonly" committed against persons or property protected by the
relevant convention.2 7 The Grave Breaches Provisions are, to a large
extent, reciprocity neutralizers. Reciprocity no longer has any role to
play when it comes to grave breaches of humanitarian law. As Mark
Osiel explains, "[i]t is immaterial, when one's own violations are
judged, that one's military opponent committed the same breaches." 28
Echoing this view, Rend Provost writes that "the fact that High
Contracting Parties cannot absolve each other of responsibility for grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions underscores the non-bilateral,
erga omnes character of some obligations under humanitarian law."2 9
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions (Common Article 1) lends
further support to the view that the obligations imposed by the laws of
war are unilateral and non-reciprocal. It provides that "[t]he High
Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the
present Convention in all circumstances." 30 This undertaking, Rend
Provost notes, "is not based on any consideration in the form of the
creation of similar obligations on behalf of other state parties to the
Conventions and Protocol."
Taken together, Common Article 1, the Grave Breaches Provisions,
and recent statements by the Human Rights Council support the
application of humanitarian law even in the absence of a reciprocal
relationships between belligerents. But what can be made of the letter of
Common Article 2 itself which, as noted above, exempts states from
their obligations vis-ti-vis non-states that neither accept nor apply
humanitarian law?
A distinction must thus be made, in international armed conflicts,
between non-signatory parties that operate in disregard of the Geneva
Conventions and those that adhere to the Geneva Conventions. Private
security and military companies provide a good example of entities that
have expressed a wish to abide and be bound by the laws of war. Some
companies have adopted internal policies that refer explicitly to the
Geneva Conventions or to the laws of war more generally. Others
org/eng/resources/documents/misc/5zmgf9.htm.
27. First Geneva Convention supranote 2, art. 51.
28. OSIEL, supra note 20, at 73.
29. PROVOST, supra note 3, at 139 (emphasis added).
30. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 1.
31.

PROVOST, supra note 3, at 137.

32. See, e.g., American Company Triple Canopy's Commitment to Human Rights,
available at http://www.triplecanopy.com/philosophy/human-rights/. As a part of Triple
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have publicly expressed their commitment to international law and have
become involved in efforts to regulate the private security and military
industry. 3 Members of the main industry association, for example, are
"encouraged to follow all rules of international humanitarian law and
human rights law that are applicable as well as all relevant international
protocols and conventions," including the Geneva Conventions and
their Protocols. 34 While such self-regulation is not devoid of
weaknesses, the efforts and declared intention of military contractors
should generally be taken as meeting the requirement of Common
Article 2 with respect to reciprocity. In other words, military contractors
may fall within the category of non-signatories who are not parties to
the Geneva Conventions but "accept and apply" the provisions thereof.
In international armed conflicts involving such companies, states are
certainly under an obligation to apply all of international humanitarian
law.
In contrast to private military companies, which increasingly
embrace the laws of war, transnational terror networks neither accept
nor apply international humanitarian law. The very modus operandi of
such networks contradicts the spirit of the laws of war (their declared
targets are often civilians or civilian infrastructure). In an armed conflict
against a terrorist organization that neither accepts nor applies the laws
of war, Common Article 2 implies that the state is not bound to respect
such laws. Ignoring, for the sake of argument, the countervailing view
of Common Article 1 and the Grave Breaches Provisions, the question
Canopy's commitment to conducting its operations in a legal, ethical, and moral manner, the
company has adopted an organization-wide human rights policy to further inform and educate
its employees: "The policy states that Triple Canopy's business conduct be guided by the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other applicable human rights documents
and principles. These include the Chemical Weapons Convention, Convention Against Torture,
Geneva Conventions (including Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions), and the
Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights." Triple Canopy adds that it "operates an
Employee Helpline where employees may report concerns directly to the company's senior
leadership." Id. G4S' Business Ethics Policy, available at http://www.g4s.com/en/Social%20
Responsibility/Our/o20ethics/~/mediafFiles/Corporate%20Files/g4sbusiness-ethics policy.ash
x ("G4S supports the principles of the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and we are committed to upholding these principles in our policies, procedures and practices.
Respect for human rights is and will remain integral to our operations").
33. See, e.g., Aegis' statement on its website, Regulation, Ethics and Sector Reform,
AEGIS,
http://www.aegisworld.com/index.php/about-us/regulation-ethics-and-sector-reform-2
(last visited Jan. 28, 2011). Aegis has long been a supporter of Regulation of the Private
Security Company industry. Aegis has financially supported and is a founding member of the
British Association of Private Security Companies (BAPSC) which lobbies for regulation in the
private sector in the United Kingdom. The BAPSC has developed, together with its members, a
comprehensive Code of Conduct. Id.
34. ISOA, Code of Conduct, Int'l Sec. Operations Assn. 1, http://stability-operations.org/
index.php (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
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arises whether, under Common Article 2 itself, a state may cease to be
bound by all or part of humanitarian law. Do the laws of war continue to
apply at all in an international armed conflict pitting a state against a
noncompliant non-state entity, such as al Qaeda, for example?
In recent years, a consensus has emerged that certain humanitarian
norms apply to all actors in all armed conflicts. Defining these
minimum standards goes beyond the scope of this paper but it should be
noted that the "Minimum Humanitarian Standards" defined by Judge
Meron and the Turku Declaration of 1990 constitute pertinent examples
of this trend. 35 The "Minimum Humanitarian Standards" applicable to
all actors in all conflicts would echo and expand Article 75 of
Additional Protocol I, which provides that captives in international
armed conflicts who are not entitled to prisoner of war status
shall be treated humanely in all circumstances and shall enjoy, at
a minimum, the protection provided by this Article without any
adverse distinction based upon race, colour, sex, language,
religion or belief, political or other opinion, national or social
origin, wealth, birth or other status, or on any other similar
36
criteria.
Article 75 further provides that "[e]ach Party shall respect the
person, honour, convictions and religious practices of all such persons,"
and prohibits "at any time and at any place" the threat and infliction of
violence, murder, torture, corporal punishment, mutilation, the taking of
hostages, and collective punishment.3 7 It also provides guarantees in
cases of arrest or detention, and criminal convictions. The commitment
of Additional Protocol I to the concept of minimal protection for all is
most apparent in Article 75(7)(b), which provides that persons accused
of war crimes or crimes against humanity shall be protected "whether or
not the crimes of which they are accused constitute grave breaches of
the Conventions or of this Protocol." 38 This provision illustrates the
35. Theodor Meron, The Humanization of HumanitarianLaw, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 239,
273-74 (2000) (Meron suggests that key procedural safeguards such as proportionality and
nondiscrimination be part of "minimum humanitarian standards," as well as core judicial or due
process guarantees, limitations on excessive use of force and on means and methods of combat,
the prohibition of deportation, rules pertaining to administrative or preventive detention and
humane treatment, and guarantees of humanitarian assistance); see also Abo Akademi,
Declaration of Minimum Humanitarian Standards, http://web.abo.fi/instut/imr/publications/
publicationsonlinetext.htm (last visited Dec. 31, 2011).
36. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 75, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S.
3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I] (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
37. Id.
38. Id. art. 75(b).
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broad scope of application of Article 75-even individuals who have
committed 3Fave violations of humanitarian law benefit from its
protections.
That a set of minimum protections is available to all actors in all
armed conflicts also transpires from Article 3 common to the four
Geneva Conventions (Common Article 3) applicable to noninternational armed conflicts: "[plersons taking no active part in the
hostilities, including members of armed forces who have laid down their
arms and those placed hors de combat by sickness, wounds, detention,
or any other cause, shall in all circumstances be treated humanely."4 0
To conclude, while the Geneva Conventions communicate
apparently contradictory messages on the reciprocity of obligations
under the law, by their own terms they contemplate the suspension of
the laws of war only in the most limited of circumstances-namely in
the case of international armed conflicts involving states and non-state
entities that neither accept nor apply humanitarian law. Even in these
limited circumstances, the "suspension" of the laws of war is only
partial: the core obligations to distinguish between civilian and military
objectives and avoid causing unnecessary harm and suffering, for
example, continue to apply. That a minimal set of unilateral obligations
apply to states in all conflicts, involving all types of actors, is supported
by the letter and spirit of Common Article 1 ("[h]igh Contracting Parties
undertake to respect and to ensure respect for the present Convention in
all circumstances"), the reasoning of the Pictet Commentary (regarding
the Geneva Conventions as a "series of unconditional engagements"),
the declarations of the U.N. Human Rights Council (not taking into
account the disregard by a non-state entity of its obligations when
analyzing the obligations of the opposing state), Article 75 of
Additional Protocol I (affording human treatment to all in international
armed conflicts), Common Article 3 (affording human treatment to all
in non-international armed conflicts), and a growing amount of state
practice.41 In other words, the conflicting messages given by the laws of
39. This view has recently been reiterated in the Interpretive Guidance on the Notion of
Direct Participationin Hostilities. Interpretive Guidance, infra note 53, at 11 n. 15. In the
ICRC's view, in international armed conflict, any person failing to qualify for prisoner-of-war
status under Article 4 GC III must be afforded the findamental guarantees set out in Article 75
AP I, which have attained customary nature and, subject to the nationality requirements of
Article 4 GC IV, also remains a protected person within the meaning of GC IV. Id.
40. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 3(1).
12, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1193 (Aug. 28, 1998) (In the
41. See, e.g., S.C. Res. 1193,
context of the Taliban's offensive in northern Afghanistan, the Security Council declared that
"all parties to the conflict are bound to comply with their obligations under international
humanitarian law and in particular under the Geneva Conventions."); Institute of International
Law Res., The Application ofInternationalHumanitarianLaw andFundamentalHuman Rights,
in Armed Conflicts in which non-State Entities are Parties,Berlin Sess. art. II (Aug. 15, 1999)
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war themselves as to the role of reciprocity can be resolved by saying
that in the vast majority of conflicts, all (or at least part) of humanitarian
law applies without any condition of reciprocity.
B. Note on Non-InternationalArmed Conflict
To this point, I have dealt primarily with the relevance of reciprocity
in international armed conflicts. 42 In non-international armed conflicts,
the role of reciprocity must be assessed by reference to the specific
norms governing such conflicts.4 3
Norms applicable to non-international armed conflicts are contained
in Common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II to the Geneva
Conventions (Additional Protocol II).44 Unlike Common Article 2,
Common Article 3 includes no reference to cases in which one party to
the conflict may not behave in accordance with the laws of war.4 5 Why
did the drafters not include a reference to reciprocity in cases of non(The Institute, aware that "armed conflicts in which non-State entities have become more and
more numerous and increasingly motivated in particular by ethnic, religious or racial causes,"
declared that "[a]ll parties to armed conflicts in which non-State entities areparties, irrespective
of their legal status . . . have the obligation to respect international humanitarian law as well as
fundamental human rights.") (emphasis added); Prosecutor v. Sam Hinga Norman (2004), Case
SCSL-2004-14-AR72(E) 1 2 (Sierra Leone) ("[I]t is well settled that all parties to an armed
conflict, whether states or non-State actors, are bound by international humanitarian law, even
though only states may become parties to international treaties").
42. "International armed conflict" is defined as a conflict between two or more states.
Cases of partial or total occupation are considered international armed conflicts as per Article 2
common to all four Geneva Conventions. To these two situations, Article 1(4) of Additional
Protocol I (which has not been ratified by all states) also adds the specific category of fights
against colonial domination and alien occupation and against racist regimes in the exercise of
the right of self-determination. Additional Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 1(4).
43. Conflicts "not of an international character" include conflicts between government
forces and non-state actors, and conflicts between two non-state actors on the territory of a
single state (in these conflicts, state participation is generally not required). Examples would
include the conflict between the Sri Lankan government and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
Eelam, the ethnic conflict in Rwanda, and the conflict involving the United States in
Afghanistan. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 8(2)(f), July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. It is also worth noting that a non-international armed conflict may be
"internationalized" if a state intervenes in that conflict or if one of the non-state entities acts on
behalf of a state. While central to International Humanitarian Law (IHL), the distinction
between international and non-international armed conflict has lost much of its relevance in
recent years-in part because it fails to capture the reality and subtlety of modern warfare. See,
e.g., James G. Stewart, Towards a Single Definition of Armed Conflict in International
HumanitarianLaw: A CritiqueofInternationalizedArmed Conflict, INT'L REV. RED CROSS 31314 (2003).
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609
[hereinafter Additional Protocol II] (entered into force Dec. 7, 1978).
45. See Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, arts. 2-3.
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international armed conflict as they did in Common Article 2? In noninternational armed conflicts, by definition, a state is fighting against an
entity that is not party to the Geneva Conventions (or two non-state
groups are fighting each other). The existence of a non-international
armed conflict inherently suggests a non-reciprocal relationship
between the warring parties. Yet, the purpose of Common Article 3 and
Additional Protocol II is precisely to extend the application of the laws
of war to such conflicts. There was no reason to indicate that
humanitarian law applies to non-state entities or to states that are not
party to the Geneva Conventions since the objective of these
instruments was precisely to subject this type of non-reciprocal, nonsymmetrical, conflict to the laws of war-without any condition of
reciprocity.
In non-international armed conflicts, therefore, there is no need to
distinguish between entities that comply with the law and those that do
not. Whether terrorist organizations or private military companies or
some other kind of actor are involved, and whether or not they respect
the law, Common Article 3 (and, when appropriate, Additional Protocol
II) applies. Because non-international armed conflict takes into account
the lack of reciprocity ab initio, the applicability of the laws of war is
never conditioned upon reciprocity between the parties to such
conflicts. 46
The table below summarizes how reciprocity or the lack thereof
affects the application of the laws of war to armed conflicts involving
non-state actors:

46. I should note that in my view Article 1 of Additional Protocol II does not introduce
any element of reciprocity in non-international armed conflicts. In order to qualify as an
organized armed group to which Additional Protocol II would apply, such a group must have the
ability to implement Additional Protocol II. I interpret this requirement as one calling for a
certain level of organization and discipline within the group-or, as the Commentary to
Additional Protocol II puts it, a "minimum infrastructure" necessary to implement the law. See
CLAUDE PILLOUD ET AL., COMMENTARY ON THE ADDITIONAL PROTOCOLS OF 8 JUNE 1977 TO THE

GENEVA CONVENTIONS OF 12 AUGUST 1949

4470 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 1987),
availableat www.loc.gov/rr/frd/MilitaryLaw/pdf/CommentaryGCProtocols.pdf.
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International Armed
Conflict

Non-international
Armed Conflict

State v. State
(including occupation
and wars of national
liberation)

State v. Non-state
Non-state v. Non-state

Abiding non-state
actor
Ex: Private
Military Company

All of IHL applies

All of Common
Article 3 and/or AP II
rules apply

Non-abiding nonstate actor
Ex: Terrorist
network

Part of IHL applies

All of Common
Article 3/AP II rules
apply

As the table shows, the absence of reciprocity affects the application
of humanitarian law rules only in international armed conflicts
involving entities that openly disregard the laws of war. While Common
Article 2 suggests that the Geneva Conventions do not apply to such
situations, other provisions of the Geneva Conventions (the Grave
Breaches Provisions, for example) and subsequent developments in
humanitarian law indicate that its core norms still apply.47 To
paraphrase Louis Henkin, it might therefore be said that almost all of
international humanitarian law applies to almost all armed conflicts
involving non-state actors, almost all of the time. 48 The only conflicts in
which part of international humanitarian law (and not all of it) might be
suspended or relaxed are international armed conflicts involving states
and noncompliant non-state entities. Even in these conflicts, the absence
of reciprocity does not render the laws of war wholly inapplicable. At
the very least, humanitarian law provides minimum protections and
obligations to all actors in all armed conflicts. In other words, the
absence of reciprocity among the parties should not, in the
overwhelming majority of cases, constitute an obstacle to the
47. The content of these core norms has been debated in particular questions such as how
the proportionality calculation might be affected by the use of human shields by a terrorist
organization or how the rules of the targeting apply to civilian-looking combatants. The limited
scope of this Article does not allow for a treatment of these important questions.
48.

Louis HENKIN, How NATIONS BEHAVE: LAW AND FOREIGN POLICY 47 (2d ed. 1979)

("It is probably the case that almost all nations observe almost all principles of international
law and almost all of their obligationsalmost all ofthe time").
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application of the laws of war in conflicts involving non-state actors.
What remains to be determined is how certain rules (such as
proportionality and targeting) might be relaxed in light of the provisions
(and limited circumstances) envisaged by Common Article 2.
III. DISTINCTION-OR THE APPLICATION OF THE LAWS OF WAR TO
NON-STATE ACTORS

The laws of war rest on the fundamental assumption that a
distinction can (and should) be made between civilians and
combatants.4 9 Many of the rules governing the conduct of war stem
from this absolute distinction, such as, for example, the rules
determining which targets are legitimate. The principle of distinction
also underpins the rights and obligations of individuals in times of warsuch as civilian immunity, prisoner-of-war status, and the protected
status of religious and medical personnel.o
Undoubtedly, the principle of distinction worked well enough when
war was a state-to-state affair, with dueling sovereigns or empires
battling for territory or treasure on clearly delineated battlefields.
Adopted in 1949 in the wake of the First and Second World Wars, the
Geneva Conventions crystallized this view of warfare-regulating war
by clearly defining the rights and obligations of civilians and
combatants, which they treat as separate and identifiable groups. 5 ' The
assumption that civilians and combatants are easily distinguishable in
war resulted from the recent experience of the state parties with
conflicts between large, standing armies at the service of sovereign
states. Generally speaking, and setting aside the case of partisans (also a
product of Second World War experiences), the Geneva Conventions
envisage the active involvement of non-state actors in warfare only to
deny them the legal benefits afforded to ordinary soldiers.S2
But the modern battlefield is different than that contemplated by the
Geneva Conventions and earlier international instruments. Modem
warfare features an array of non-state participants playing central roles
49. The International Court of Justice has declared the principle of distinction a "cardinal
principle . . . constituting the fabric of humanitarian law ...
Legality of the Threat or Use of
Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 1996 I.C.J. 226, 78 (July 8). It has also been recognized
as a rule of customary law applicable to all states, even to those who have not ratified the
Protocol, by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights.1JEAN-MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALDBECK, CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Cambridge Univ. Press rev. ed. 2009)

(2005), available at www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/other/customary-intemational-humanitarianlaw-i-icrc-eng.pdf.
50.

See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at 3, 11.

51.
52.

Supra note 2.
See supra note 91.
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in hostilities, often with substantial resources and firepower at their
disposal. From guerrilla and terrorist groups in South Asia, to American
military contractors in Iraq and human shields in Gaza, the legal status
of the varied participants in modem conflicts is less clear-cut than in the
past. This is particularly the case in fluid urban battle zones, where
combatants can easily find shelter among, hide behind, or blend into
civilian populations. Distinguishing between civilians and combatants
in these situations--even at the level of theory-is increasingly
difficult. Non-state actors find themselves somewhere along the
spectrum of the traditional "black and white" civilian/combatant divide,
though the laws of war do not contemplate a spectrum but rather clearcut categories.
Consider, for example, the case of private military contractors, tens
of thousands of whom support U.S. forces in Iraq, Afghanistan, and
elsewhere. The range of tasks entrusted to these actors illustrates the
problems inherent in the distinctions set forth in international legal
instruments. While not part of a standing army, private military
contractors are a far cry from ordinary civilians. Contractors perform
activities ranging from preparing food and building bases to delivering
armaments and fuel, planning combat operations alongside ordinary
troops, gathering intelligence, providing personal security for senior
military and civilian officials of belligerents, and training soldiers in the
use of military hardware. By virtue of the environment they operate in,
the activities they perform, and their close relationship with armed
forces, military contractors are in practice more akin to combatants than
they are to civilians. And yet the Geneva Conventions generally regard
them as civilians because they do not meet the formal requirements of
combatant status. Only in limited circumstances are they treated as
civilians directly participating in hostilities a status which does not
allow for any predictability, but which at least recognizes that they
constitute legitimate targets.5 3
Their legal status is in stark contrast to the reality on the ground: in
the eyes of the "enemy," contractors are clearly allied with the armed
forces they are hired to support. 54 However deliberate their attempts to
53. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 51(3); NILS MELZER, INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE ON THE NOTION OF DIRECT PARTICIPATION IN HOSTILITIES UNDER INTERNATIONAL
HUMANITARIAN LAw 70 (Int'l Comm. of the Red Cross 2009) [hereinafter INTERPRETIVE
GUIDANCE].
54. That contractors are often regarded as a proxy of the hiring state is evident in the
attacks suffered by companies over the years. In 1995, a car bomb exploded in one of the Saudi
National Guards' training facilities in Riyadh. Seven employees of Vinnell died, including five
American nationals. James Gerstenzang, Vinnell Corp., Targeted in Riyadh Before, Loses 9
More Workers, L.A. TIMES, May 14, 2003, availableat http://articles.latimes.com/2003/may/14/
news/war-vinnelll4. The attack is widely regarded as having been directed specifically at
Vinnell's Guard training contract. The company was once again targeted in 2003, when several
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steer clear of combat, private contractors do take part in military
activities on or near the battlefield. Telling examples include the
involvement of Vinnell Corporation employees in repelling Saudi rebels
in 1979,55 and the 2003 capture of employees of California Microwave
Systems by the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (known as
FARC) while conducting a surveillance mission on behalf of the
Colombian government.5 In such cases, it is extremely difficult for
friendly or enemy forces (or, for that matter, for outside observers) to
determine whether the contractors are civilians or combatants. The
application of the current laws of war to these actors often leads to
absurd or inconsistent outcomes.
The situation with terrorist organizations is even more complex,
because they tend to be well-integrated into and make extensive use of
civilian populations. They might even view themselves as civilians,
engaging in combat activities only episodically. Terrorist groups make
tactical use of civilians to hide from their enemies; they target civilian
populations to achieve political and military objectives; and they
sometimes draw fire upon civilians to arouse public sentiment. They
often "rejoin" the civilian population immediately after engaging in
hostile acts by simply putting down a weapon and walking home. It is
difficult to identify terrorists-to-be before attacks are actually carried
out, and any attempt at stopping them may lead to civilian casualties. 57
Today's accepted legal tools do not allow for a straightforward,
before-the-fact, or consistent determination of a non-state actor's legal
status. As they are presently interpreted, the Geneva Conventions set
suicide car bombs went off near a Vinnell housing compound, and in 2005 when the company's
compound in Riyadh was attacked by Al Qaeda affiliates. Id. The repeated attacks against
Vinnell illustrate the fact that the company is regarded by the enemy as an extension of the
United States Army in Saudi Arabia, designed to advance key strategic goals of the United
States. Id.
55. Matthew J. Gaul, Regulating the New Privateers: Private Military Service
Contractingand the Modern Marque and Reprisal Clause, 31 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1489, 1497-98
(1998); William Hartung, MercenariesInc.: How a U.S. Company Props Up the House ofSaud,
PROGRESSIVE, Apr. 1996. Vinnell employees also accompanied the SANG into combat at first
major ground engagement of the Gulf War-the battle of Khafji. See Esther Schrader, U.S.
Companies Hired to Train Foreign Armies, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 14, 2002, available at
http://articles.latimes.com/2002/apr/14/news/mn-37825.
56. John McQuaid, Citizens, Not Soldiers, TIMES PICAYUNE, Nov. 11, 2003, available at
www.nola.com/speced/fatalmissionlindex.ssf?/speced/fatalmission/citizens.html (The hostages
-Stansell, Marc Gonsalves and Thomas Howes-were captured by the guerrillas when their
surveillance plane crashed on February 13, 2003. American pilot Tom Janis and Colombian
Army Sgt. Luis Alcides Cruz were shot and killed by FARC forces).
57. Consider, for example, the shooting of innocent civilians mistaken for terrorists,
including that of Brazilian Jean Charles de Menezes in London in July 2005 by the British
police, following attacks on London's transportation system. BBC News, Shot Man not
Connected to Bombing, BBC NEWS (July 23,2005), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/4711021 .stm.
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forth a view of combatant status that is highly formalistic, membershipbased, and excludes a number of non-state entities from the definition.
In a provision widely held as defining the meaning of combatant,
Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention enumerates the categories of
persons entitled to prisoner of war status as including:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as
well as members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of
such armed forces.
(2) Members of other militias and members of other volunteer
corps, including those of organized resistance movements,
belonging to a Party to the conflict and operating in or outside
their own territory, even if this territory is occupied, provided that
such militias or volunteer corps, including such organized
resistance movements, fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the
laws and customs of war.
Though widely embraced, this definition is problematic, if not
anachronistic. The requirements set forth by Article 4 of the Third
Geneva Convention are difficult to apply in practice. To take only one
example, it is far from clear whether contractors meet the "recognizable
at a distance" test. Most contractors do wear company hats or polo shirts
with the company logo, but is this sufficient to be recognizable "at a
distance" as required by Article 4?
One of the difficulties with the Geneva Conventions-and the Third
Geneva Convention in particular-is that they focus on membership in
identifiable and organized armed groups as the touchstone of combatant
status. In other words, the Geneva Conventions, as commonly
understood, focus not on a person's activity but on his or her
membership status: only soldiers and their like are considered
combatants.
I argue that a contemporary reading of the Geneva Conventions
requires placing the four conditions set forth by Article 4 in context, and
that a substantial amount of history and moral tradition must be read
into the text. I also argue that recent additions to the Geneva
Conventions, in particular Additional Protocol I of 1977, should inform
58.

Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 4.
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our understanding of the Conventions (and particularly, the Third
Geneva Convention). Non-state actors should fall within an expansive
understanding of combatant status if we are "to respect and to ensure
respect for this Protocol in all circumstances" 59 as the principle of
distinction requires.
A. Early Formulationsof the PrincipleofDistinction
The principle of distinction is an age-old principle. As Geoffrey Best
notes:
From as far back as there is written evidence of the laws of
peoples and the decrees of kings come examples of injunctions to
distinguish in combat between warriors and the rest: between the
arms-bearing, "combatant" part of society, the part which alone
made it able to conduct war, and the other "non-combatant" parts
whose contribution to war-making could be at most indirect and,
in the case of those old men, women, and children who have
always fiFred as the essential non-combatants, probably not
even that.
This passage captures well the nature of warfare in past centuries
when large standing armies met on battlefields removed from
population centers and the bulk of an army's troops wielded muskets,
cannons, and swords. 6 1 The laws of war derive from this traditional
view of warfare, establishing a clear distinction between civilians and
combatants in order to protect the former based on their nonparticipation in the war effort.
A number of ancient and widely-embraced codes already required
that belligerents exercise care not to kill civilians. Although each
civilization expressed this requirement slightly differently, the
motivation remained the same: to spare civilians from the brutality of
warfare. While the injunction to avoid harming civilians was sometimes
couched in legal terms, often it was no more than the expression of a
moral or ethical duty on the part of the warring parties. 62 The origins of
noncombatant immunity, in other words, are not exclusively legal.
As Best points out, most deserving of protection against hostilities
59.

See Additional Protocol I, supranote 36, art. 1.

60.
61.

GEOFFREY BEST, WAR AND LAW SINCE 1945 24 (Clarendon Press 1994).
MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 42 (Basic Book, Inc. 1977) ("[T]he

general conception of war as a combat between combatants . .. turns up again and again in
anthropological and historical accounts.").
62.

See LEON FRIEDMAN, THE LAW OF WAR: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 5 (Random

House 1972).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2011

19

Florida Journal of International Law, Vol. 23, Iss. 3 [2011], Art. 2
FLORIDA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

346

[Vol. 23

were women and children. 6 3 From the earliest times, women and
children have been regarded as a protected category of persons. The Old
Testament provides a valuable illustration of this special status in the
chapter of Deuteronomy setting out the rules ajplicable in wars waged
against "cities that are very distant from you." 4 In these wars, fighters
were allowed to "strike every male thereof by the . . . edge of the
sword," but they were told that "women, . . . the little ones, the

livestock, and all that is in the city, even all the spoil thereof, [you shall]
take to yourself. .*.." Similarly placing an emphasis on the treatment
of women and children, Mohamed's successor, Caliph Abu-Bakhr,
urged the Muslim Arab army invading Christian Syria in 634 A.D. not
to mutilate or kill a child, man, or woman.66 These examples are not
meant to suggest that the Abrahamic religions only advocated peace and
protection. They did, however, establish a distinction between who
ought to be killed or spared as part of a divinely justified war.
Only later did early just war theorists give a legal dimension to what
religious teachings and morality had identified as the limits of warfare.
In its effort to establish rules governing the conduct of war, early legal
scholarship focused on the elaboration of specific guidelines on who
could be killed in war. This long process-which eventually led to the
codification of the principle of distinction-began in the fifth century
with the prominent philosopher and theologian St. Augustine. Although
St. Augustine did not distinguish between soldiers and combatants, he
developed the concepts (and terminology) that others after him used to
shape noncombatant immunity. 67 Following in St. Augustine's
footsteps, St. Thomas Aquinas took two important steps when he
proclaimed in the thirteenth century that "it is in no way lawful to slay
the innocent." 68 First, he set forth the notion that certain acts ought to be
prohibited in all wars, whether just or unjust.69 Second, he established
categories among enemy nationals, distinguishing between those who
are innocent (and can never be killed), and those who are guilty (and

63. See BEST, supra note 60, at 257.
64. Deuteronomy 20:15 (New King James Version).
65. Id. 20:13-14.
66. Waldemar A. Solf, Protection of Civilians against the Effects of Hostilities under
Customary InternationalLaw and Under Protocol I, 1 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 117, 118
(1986) (citing MAJID KHADDURI, WAR AND PEACE IN THE LAW OF ISLAM 102 (1955)); ALAN
RoSAS, THE LEGAL STATUS OF PRISONERS OF WAR, A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN

LAW APPLICABLE IN ARMED CONFLICTS 48 (Suoma Lainen Tiedeakatemia rev. 2005) (1976).
67. See generally SAINT AUGUSTINE, CITY OF GOD (Henry Bettenson trans., Penguin

Books 1972).
68.

THOMAS AQUINAS,

THE SUMMA THEOLOGICA, Question XL, Sixth Art. (Henry

Bettenson trans., Penguin Books 1972).
69. Id.
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can be killed).7 o
Progressively, innocence and the bearing of arms became the
yardsticks for noncombatant immunity. In the period spanning from the
late tenth to thirteenth centuries, the Church adopted regulations
granting immunity from violence to the clergy, peasants, merchants,
children, women, and, more generally, anyone not bearing arms. 7 ' As
for the concept of innocence, while it remained at the heart of
noncombatant immunity, it became understood independently of the
notion of punitive war. Instead of conceiving war as a way to punish the
enemy-both combatants and civilians-Hugo Grotius promoted the
laws of war as a set of rules founded in custom and natural justice
applicable even to those on the unjust side of war. 72 While some of his
predecessors had touched on the subject, Grotius was the first to give
strong and sustained force to the argument that restraint, moderation,
and compassion should apply to all belligerents in times of war.7 ' While
immunity had been conceived as an attribute of those waging a just war,
Grotius argued that restraint should also be exercised toward innocent
enemy civilians (i.e., those who are not armed or immediately
harmful).74
Jean-Jacques Rousseau's formulation of the principle of distinction
in the eighteenth century further highlighted the importance of bearing
arms when distinguishing between civilians and combatants.
Rousseau's formulation of noncombatant immunity was couched in
universal, non-legal, and non-religious terms, and it distinguished the
soldier who carries his weapon, on one hand, and the "man" who has
laid it down, on the other:
Since the purpose of war is to destroy the enemy State, it is
legitimate to kill the latter's defenders so long as they are
carrying arms; but as soon as they lay them down and surrender,
they cease to be enemies or agents of the enemy, and again
become mere men, and it is no longer legitimate to take their
1*75
7
lives.

70.

Id.

71.

See, e.g.,

Peace of God-Synod of Charroux, 989, in

INTERNET MEDIEVAL

SOURCEBOOK (Paul Halsall ed., Jan. 1996), available at http://cassian.memphis.edu/history/
jmblythe/3370/PeaceOfGod989.htm.
72.

HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE: THREE VOLUME SET (NATURAL LAW

AND ENLIGHTENMENT CLASSICS) 1439-45 (Richard Tuck ed., Liberty Fund 2005) (1625).
73.

JEAN PICTET, DEVELOPMENT AND PRINCIPLES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW

9 (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers 1985).
74.
75.

See GROTIUS, supra note 72, at 1439-45. See also PICTET, supra note 73, at 20.
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, Du CONTRAT SOCIAL 111 (Ronald Grimsley ed., 1972)

(1762) (translation provided by author) (emphasis added).
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Moving beyond just war theory, Rousseau established (and durably
so) that there are two categories of enemy nationals: while those "who
are carrying arms" deserve to die, others deserve to be protected.
Protection from attack, in other words, is to be granted to civilians on
both sides of a conflict. With Rousseau, the principle of distinctionand the importance of bearing arms at its core-was firmly established.
A century later the principle of distinction was finally formulated in
legal terms with the drafting of the Lieber Code, a pamphlet prepared by
the jurist Francis Lieber at the request of General Henry Wager Halleck,
General-in-Chief of the Union Armies during the American Civil War. 76
It is the first document which can be said to have codified the laws of
war. 77 The Lieber Code could not have phrased the principle of
distinction in clearer terms: "[a]ll enemies in regular war are divided
into two general classes-that is to say, into combatants and
noncombatants, or unarmed citizens of the hostile government." 78
Building on Grotius, the Lieber Code emphasized that restraint
should be exercised even vis-6-vis enemy noncombatants.7 9 Building on
Rousseau, it defined noncombatants as "unarmed citizens of the hostile
government."80 All subsequent legal pronouncements governing the
conduct of war reiterate the essential distinction established by the
Lieber Code between civilians and combatants. 8 '
Most remarkable is the definition of armed forces provided by the
Hague Regulations of 1907 as consisting of both combatants and
noncombatants. 82 This definition implies that only members of the
armed forces actually involved in combat constitute legitimate targets.
The Hague Regulations provide that the activity performed by the
76. International Committee of the Red Cross, Introduction to Instructions for the
Government of the U.S. in the Field (LIEBER CODE) (1863), available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.
nsf/73cb71dl8dc4372741256739003e6372/a25aa5871a04919bcl2563cd002d65c5?OpenDocu
ment (last visited Jan. 27, 2011).
77. Id.
78. Id. art. 155.
79. See id. arts. 18-19.
80. Id. art. 155.
81. See, e.g., Declaration Renouncing the Use, in Time of War, of Explosive Projectiles
Under 400 Grammes Weight, Nov. 29, 1868, 18 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 1), at 474;
Project of an Int'l Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs of War art. 9, Aug. 27, 1874,
4 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2), at 219, available at http://www.icrc.org/IHL.nsf/INTR0/265
?OpenDocument; Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land annex art. 22,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277, 205 Consol. T.S. 277 [hereinafter Hague Regulations], availableat
http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/385ec082b509e76c41256739003e636d/ldl726425f6955aecl25641e
0038bfd6; 1923 Rules Concerning the Control of Wireless Telegraphy in Time of War and Air
Warfare arts. 13, 16, 34, available at http://www.icrc.org/ihl.nsf/INTRO/275?OpenDocument
(last visited Dec. 29, 2011).
82. Hague Regulations, supra note 81, annex art. 3.
83. Id.
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soldier matters, at least for purposes of targeting (note that all members
of the armed forces-irrespective of the type of activity they performare entitled to prisoner of war status under the Hague Regulations).
Subsequent legal instruments abandoned this activity-based approach to
combatant status in favor of one based upon membership.
On the whole, early formulations of the laws of war provide valuable
insight into the considerations that guided the development of
combatant status-innocence, harmlessness and the bearing of arms.
The activity-based definition of combatant status embedded in the 1907
Hague Regulations not only reflected these considerations, but also lent
support to the view that activity ought to play a role in identifying those
According to this conception of
entitled to combatant status.
combatant status, certain non-state actors (in particular those who
engage in military activities on behalf of a state) would qualify today
for combatant status.
B. The PrincipleofDistinction as Formulatedin the Geneva
Conventions andAdditionalProtocolI
The Hague Regulations and early formulations of the principle of
distinction took into consideration the nature of the activity in which
individuals were engaged, in particular whether they bore arms and
were involved in combat.8 6 But in the wake of two world wars fought
largely by opposing conventional forces, with millions dead in
indiscriminate attacks on civilian infrastructure, and following the
detention of hundreds of thousands of uniformed soldiers, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 shifted the focus from an actor's activity to
membership.87 The Third Geneva Convention views combatant status
through the prism of large-scale conventional warfare: all members of
the armed forces are combatants, regardless of what their function
within the armed forces might be.8 8
What is more, the Geneva Conventions define combatants in an
inconvenient place: the conditions of accession to combatant status are
set forth in the Third Geneva Convention, which deals with prisoners of
war.89 This less than ideal confusion between the concept of combatant
and the protection of prisoner of war is at the heart of the Geneva
84. Id.
85. See Convention (II) with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land and its
annex: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land July 29, 1899, 32 Stat.
1803, 26 Martens Nouveau Recueil (ser. 2), at 949, available at http://www.icrc.orglihl.nsf/
FULL/150.
86. Id. annex arts. 1-2.
87. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, arts. 3-4.
88. See id. art. 4.
89. See id.
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Conventions. The Geneva Conventions' drafters, mindful that the new
treaties conferred benefits upon captured combatants, were reluctant to
extend the benefits of prisoner of war status to any but the most
legitimate, well-trained, and accountable parties. It is for this reason that
under Article 4 only "members of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict" (and similar actors operating under similar conditions) qualify
as combatants.90 The only exception (i.e., a non-state actor not operating
under such strict conditions, but nevertheless entitled to prisoner of war
status) is based on the model of partisans-allied, it should be recalled,
with the victors of the Second World War.91
The development of the laws of war, however, did not end in 1949.
With awareness of the narrowness of the Third Geneva Convention and,
given the backdrop of the wars of liberation and guerrilla movements of
the 1960s and 1970s, the Additional Protocols to the Geneva
Conventions were adopted in 1977 with a far more expansive view of
both armed conflict and combatant status. 92 Placing a greater emphasis
on activity, Article 43(1) of Additional Protocol I provides that:
The armed forces of a Party to a conflict consist of all organized
armed forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that Party for the conduct of its subordinates, even
if that Party is represented by a government or an authority not
recognized by an adverse Party. Such armed forces shall be
subject to an internal disciplinary system which, inter alia, shall
enforce compliance with the rules of international law applicable
in armed conflict. 93
This definition of armed forces widens the scope of actors entitled to
combatant status. Under Article 43's expanded definition, an indirect or
implicit relationship between a non-state entity and a state party can
90. Id.
91. PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 52. At the time of drafting of Article 4, the
discussion focused on whether partisans (or resistance movements) would have to meet more
conditions than ordinary combatants in order to be granted prisoner of war status or whether
such conditions should be somewhat relaxed to enable them to accede to such status. After much
heated debate, it was decided to assimilate resistance movements to militias and corps of
volunteers not forming part of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict-a move that was
regarded as an "important innovation which has become necessary as a result of the experience
of the Second World War." See Comm. II, Third Meeting, Apr. 27, 1949, Prisoner of War
Convention, at 242s; and Report of Committee 11 to the Plenary Assembly of the Diplomatic
Conference of Geneva, at 561. That the Article was meant primarily to address the question of
the legal status of partisans under the laws of war is also apparent from the fact that the Pictet
Commentary not only addresses sub-paragraph (2) of Article 4 under the heading "Partisans,"
but also repeatedly refers to partisans in its analysis of the provision.
92. See Additional Protocol I, supra note 36.
93. Id. art. 43(1) (emphasis added).
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establish combatant status. 94 In place of the four conditions required by
the Geneva Conventions, Additional Protocol I only requires that two
conditions be met: (1) responsible command under a Party to the
conflict, and (2) behavior in accordance with the laws of war.95 Gone
are the requirements to wear uniforms or carry weapons openly. Such
requirements are no longer relevant to identify combatants for purposes
of targeting; they only matter "with respect to a combatant's entitlement
to prisoner of war status." 96
Setting aside continuing disagreement over the benefits afforded to
non-state combatants (i.e., Hezbollah or al-Qaeda) or the status of
Article 43 of Additional Protocol I as customary international law, 97
Additional Protocol I certainly marks a return to the traditional meaning
of combatant as characterizing harmful individuals, bearing arms, and
posing a threat.
The practice of certain states shows that this shift in the direction of
a more activity-based definition of combatant is gaining ground.
Military manuals of Germany and the United States (importantly not a
party to Additional Protocol I), for example, point out that there can be
non-combatant members of the armed forces besides medical and
religious personnel (i.e., members of the armed forces who do not have
any combat mission). 98
We should therefore be circumspect about using the formal,
membership-based, standards of Article 4 of the Third Geneva
Convention to define who is a combatant and who is a civilian
generally, and keep in mind the historical context surrounding the
adoption of the Geneva Conventions. The Third Geneva Convention is
substantially focused on who is entitled to benefit from prisoner of war
status; it became the touchstone of combatant status only because
combatant and noncombatant are not defined elsewhere in the
Conventions. But the rationale that guided the crystallization of the
principle of distinction and underlies the Geneva Conventionsprotecting innocent, harmless, individuals-can be instructive in
characterizing battlefield protagonists. Similarly, definitions of
combatant status adopted after 1949 (whether or not accepted by all
states) can shed light on the meaning of Article 4 of the Third Geneva

94.
95.

Id.
Id.

96. HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at 15.
97. Anthony Rogers, Combatant Status, in PERSPECTIVES ON THE ICRC STUDY ON
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Elizabeth Wilmshurst & Susane Breau eds.,

2008) (doubting whether Article 43 of Additional Protocol I has become customary international
law).
98.

HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at 13.
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Convention. 99
In particular, it is helpful to turn to Additional Protocol I when
interpreting the phrase "belonging to a Party to the conflict" contained
in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention. Article 4 provides that
"members of other militias and members of other volunteer corps,
including those of organized resistance movements, belonging to a
Party to the conflict and operating in or outside their own territory" are
combatants provided that such groups meet the required four
conditions. Depending on the interpretation of the phrase "belonging
to a Party to the conflict," certain non-state actors on today's battlefields
might therefore qualify as combatants.' 0 '
Even before Additional Protocol I was adopted, it was accepted that
neither a formal incorporation into the state's forces nor the
authorization of all of the armed group's activities by the state was
required for an armed group to "belong to a Party to the conflict" in the
meaning of Article 4. At the time, a de facto relationship between the
armed group and a arty to the conflict was deemed sufficient to meet
such requirement.
With Additional Protocol I, the type of relationship required between
the armed group and the state became even looser. Under Article 43 of
Additional Protocol I, the definition of combatants encompasses all
organized forces, groups and units which are under a command
responsible to that party for the conduct of its subordinates, have an
internal disciplinary system, and respect international humanitarian
law. o0 By conferring combatant status to armed groups under a
command responsible to a party to the conflict, Article 43(1)
retroactively sheds light on the meaning of the phrase "belonging to a
party to the conflict" of Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention:
"belonging to a party to the conflict" essentially means being in a
relationship of subordination with a belligerent state (i.e., receiving
99. Incidentally, extending international humanitarian law (IHL) protections to as many
persons as possible was one of the declared goals of the Geneva Conventions. See generally
Commander Gregory Noone, Prisonersof War in the 21st Century: Issues in Modern Warfare,
50 NAVAL L. REV. 1, 13 (2004); Stanislaw Nahlik, L'Extension du Statut de Combatant h la
Lumidre du Protocol I de Genave de 1977, RECUEIL DES COURs 213 (1979); Diplomatic
Conference, Prisoner of War, Third Meeting, Apr. 27, 1949, at 242; Hungarian Delegation, Joint
Comm. on Common Articles, First Meeting, at 11; Delegation of the Netherlands, CDDH/SR.
41, 142 (4 1st plenary meeting, May 26, 1977).
100. Third Geneva Convention, supra note 2, art. 4(A)(l)-(2) (emphasis added). The four
conditions are: being commanded by a person responsible for his subordinates, having a fixed
distinctive sign recognizable at a distance, carrying arms openly, and conducting their
operations in accordance with the laws of war.
101. Id. art. 4(A)(2).
102.

PICTET COMMENTARY, supra note 21, at 57.

103.

Additional Protocol I, supra note 36, art. 43(1).
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orders from such state, including through contract, or fighting alongside
the state's armed forces).1 04 As a result, Additional Protocol I is
commonly understood as conferring combatant status to the members of
a non-state group fighting on behalf and with the agreement of a party
to the conflict.'0
Private military contractors, like those operating on behalf of the
United States in Iraq, are a particularly good example of why the
interpretation of "belonging to a Party to the conflict" matters. There is
little doubt that employees of Xe (formerly Blackwater), Aegis, or
DynCorp operating alongside American forces in Iraq might be
considered as "belonging to a Party to the conflict," especially when
such phrase is interpreted in light of Article 43 of Additional Protocol I.
They would also, as noted above, meet that Article's second condition
of having an internal disciplinary system capable of enforcing
compliance with the laws of war.
Back to Article 4, it seems that the relaxed standards of Additional
Protocol I (which require only that they operate under a party to the
conflict and that their behavior is in accordance with the laws of war)
call for a less restrictive interpretation of Article 4's requirements with
respect to these actors' command structure, their obedience to the laws
of war, or their dress (as noted above private military contractors might
not, strictlyspeaking, display "a fixed, distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance").

The status of terrorists and members of guerilla groups under the
Geneva Conventions is more problematic. Except in the most unusual
cases (a uniformed, disciplined, openly armed, and legally-compliant
guerrilla army reporting to a state), these actors would not meet the
conditions of Article 4. They would also have difficulty meeting the
more relaxed definition of Additional Protocol I, though one can
imagine a terrorist organization or guerrilla group operating on behalf of
a Party to the conflict that acts generally in accordance with the laws of
war (i.e., targeting exclusively military forces and infrastructure). As the
laws are formulated and interpreted today, any attempt at making such
actors fit within the civilian/combatant divide requires convoluted legal
exercises.
I would argue that in the case of terrorists, members of guerillas, and
private military contractors alike, we should look to the principles
underpinning the Geneva Conventions and earlier formulations of the
principle of distinction for guidance. As the battlefield has evolved, as
104. See HENCKAERTS & DOSWALD-BECK, supra note 49, at 15.
105. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 23.
106. This is true in spite of the debate surrounding Article 43's customary nature. I do not
suggest that the requirements of Article 4 have become irrelevant. Rather, I argue for a slightly
less restrictive interpretation of these requirements.
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non-state actors have proliferated, and as the destructive capacity of
irregulars has exponentially increased, we should endeavor to subject
all non-state actors to the laws of war. This does not necessarily entail
extending to them prisoner of war status. It does, however, suggest we
step back from the purely status-based definition of Article 4 of the
Third Geneva Convention in favor of a more activity-based conception
of combatant status.
While the tendency today is to regard the restrictive interpretation of
the definition of combatant as set in stone, the analysis conducted in this
Article reminds us of the dynamic approach to combatant status. From
the earliest legal pronouncements which emphasized the nature of the
threat posed by combatants, the Geneva Conventions marked a shift
toward membership as the touchstone of combatant status. Later,
Additional Protocol I loosened the criteria of Article 4 to embrace a
wider range of actors, reverting to a more activity-based conception of
combatant-increasingly advocated by states. These shifts track the
states' interest in defining combatant more or less restrictively. After
WWII, mindful of the dangers of conventional warfare, states sought to
define membership restrictively as covering only regular members of
the armed forces. The only accepted exception was drawn up on the
basis of states' experience with partisans. Today, the shift back to a
more membership-based standard can be attributed to the challenges
states face when contending with terror and indiscriminate warfare at
the hands of irregulars. In this specific context, the constraints of
membership-only standard have led states to revert to a more activitybased conception of combatant status. The point is that the definition of
combatant has traditionally reflected states' concerns and the
geopolitical realities of the moment. What this Article suggests is to
continue this tradition, keep in mind that the legal provisions are merely
the expression of basic principles, and adapt our understanding of legal
provisions to new realities and challenges-as has historically been the
case.
C. Note on Non-InternationalArmed Conflict
For purposes of the principle of distinction, the involvement of nonstate actors in non-international armed conflicts raises one important
question. Given the technical nature of humanitarian law, there are no
combatants stricto sensu in non-international armed conflicts as
combatants are defined in the context of the Third Geneva Convention
and Additional Protocol I, both of which apply to international armed
conflict. If there are no combatants in non-international armed conflicts,
how can there be a duty to distinguish between civilians and
combatants?
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Noting this important feature of non-international armed conflicts,
the Customary InternationalHumanitarianLaw study explains that, in
non-international armed conflicts, the term "combatant" is used in the
generic sense to refer to "persons who do not enjoy the protection
against attack accorded to civilians, but does not imply a right to
combatant status or prisoner of war status."' 0 7 Similarly, the
International Committee of the Red Cross's Interpretive Guidance on
the Notion of Direct Participationin Hostilities considers that "for the
purposes of the principle of distinction in non-international armed
conflict" civilians are those individuals who are neither members of the
state's armed forces nor members of the armed forced of a non-state
party. 0 8
These statements underscore the continued relevance of the principle
of distinction, even in non-international armed conflicts. In such
conflicts, the obligation to distinguish between protected and
unprotected individuals holds, and for such limited purposes,
unprotected individuals are actually comparable to combatants in
international armed conflicts.109

IV. CONCLUSION
This Article has focused its attention on two meta-issues that arise
whenever a non-state actor is involved in hostilities: reciprocity and
distinction. Contending with these issues is indispensable as they affect
the applicability of accepted legal principles to virtually all modem
conflicts-whether they involve private military companies, wellorganized guerrilla armies, or terror organizations.
With respect to the applicability of the laws of war to conflicts
involving this type of actors, the laws themselves provide only a
confusing answer to the myriad of questions that arise. Do al-Qaeda
militants deserve the benefits of the laws of war? Are there minimum
unilateral standards that constrain states even when fighting a noncompliant actor? I have argued that while the role of reciprocity in
international humanitarian law should not be undermined, the laws of
war should continue to apply even when reciprocity is lacking. This
conclusion is warranted both by a technical analysis of the intention of
the Geneva Conventions and by an evolving consensus regarding
minimum humanitarian obligations applicable to all. By the Geneva
107.

Id.

108.

See INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 16.

109. See Rogers, supra note 97, at 109 ("[s]o there is a difference in the Study between
'combatant which denotes somebody taking an active part in hostilities' and 'combatant status,'
which implies more but does not apply in non-international armed conflicts").
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Conventions' own somewhat convoluted terms, reciprocity was never
made a prerequisite to the application of the laws of war, except in the
case of international armed conflicts involving entities that do not apply
or respect the laws of war. In such conflicts, and in such conflicts only,
a state may be absolved of some of its obligations in light of the refusal
of the non-state to comply with the laws of war.
While Common Article 2 would set aside the Geneva Conventions in
those circumstances, it is well-accepted today that, at a minimum,
certain core norms of humanitarian law apply to all actors in all armed
conflicts. In light of the growing consensus on the constant applicability
of minimum humanitarian standards, I conclude that in most conflicts
(whether international or non-international) the absence of reciprocity
will not affect the applicability of the laws of war. The only situation in
which part of humanitarian law-and not all of it-may be relaxed is an
international armed conflict involving a state and a noncompliant nonstate entity, such as a transnational terrorist network. Further analysis is
required to examine what rules, in substance, may be set aside or
relaxed in such a conflict.
I then examined the challenges of applying the laws of war to nonstate actors. Most norms of international humanitarian law have evolved
from the principle of distinction, which calls on combatants to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population and on commanders
to distinguish between civilian and military objectives. The hybrid
nature of non-state entities-they fall somewhere along the continuum
separating civilians and combatants-makes any application of the
principle of distinction to these entities extremely difficult. Non-state
actors do not fall neatly within the categories of actors entitled to the
guarantees and protections (as well as the obligations) contemplated by
the Geneva Conventions. This situation is not only adverse to the
interests of non-state participants in warfare, it also (and perhaps most
importantly) hurts the civilian population, whose protection cannot be
properly ensured." 0
This Article suggested a way to overcome issues of distinction in
conflicts involving non-state entities. The formal and technical
requirements of the contemporary laws of war should be interpreted to
allow certain non-state actors to accede to combatant statusdepending, inter alia, on whether they act on behalf of a state, respect
the laws of war, and conduct military-like activities on a regular basis.
This can be done by interpreting the definition of combatant status
110. INTERPRETIVE GUIDANCE, supra note 53, at 70 (noting that the confusion and
uncertainty as to the distinction between legitimate targets and persons protected against direct
attacks has resulted in civilians being "more likely to fall victim to erroneous or arbitrary
targeting, while armed forces-unable to properly identify their adversary-run an increased
risk of being attacked by persons they cannot distinguish from the civilian population.").
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contained in Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention within its proper
historical and legal contexts. This provision was meant to set forth the
requirements for prisoner of war status under the Geneva
Conventions-not the assessment of who is a combatant and who is a
civilian. Instead of resting solely on Article 4, our understanding of
combatant status should be informed by formulations of the principle of
distinction which preceded and followed the adoption of the Geneva
Conventions. This broader understanding of combatant status not only
takes into account a long line of religious, historical, and legal tradition;
it also upholds the law's objective to extend protection to as many
actors as possible in time of war.111

I11.

See supra note 99.
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